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 
Abstract — Technological and societal change, along with 
organisational and market change (driven by contracting-out 
and privatisation), are “creating a new generation of 
infrastructures” [1]. While inter-organisational contractual 
arrangements can improve maintenance efficiency through 
consistent and repeatable patterns of action - unanticipated 
difficulties in implementation can reduce the performance of 
these arrangements. When faced with unsatisfactory 
performance of contracting-out arrangements, government 
organisations may choose to adapt and change these 
arrangements over time, with the aim of improving 
performance. This paper enhances our understanding of ‘next 
generation infrastructures’ by examining adaptation of the 
organisational arrangements for the maintenance of these 
assets, in a case study spanning 20 years. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
key driver for changes in the maintenance of assets by 
contracting-out has been held to be the need to 
improve performance [2]. Enhancing the performance 
of inter-organisational arrangements logically requires 
adaptation and change of specific arrangements in order to 
realise the improvements sought. Recently, research has 
been called to understand how routine contractual 
arrangements [3] such as those involved in contractual 
maintenance services, adapt and change over time [4]. 
Routines have been defined as:  “recurrent interaction 
patterns involving multiple actors working to achieve a 
particular outcome” [5 p. 818]. Improved understanding of 
multi-actor inter-organisational arrangements will enhance 
our understanding of the role of governance arrangements 
in next generation infrastructures [hereafter NGI] [1]. 
This paper examines changes to the way government 
contracted-out one part of the asset management – the 
maintenance of buildings – to the private sector in a 
specific state in a specific OECD country, over a 20 year 
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period. 
It will be demonstrated that unforeseen difficulties with 
each new set of procurement arrangements led to further 
experimentation and adaptation in order to improve 
performance, and variations to one or more elements of the 
arrangements. Perceived difficulties with each set of 
arrangements resulted in further adaptation, with the goal 
of further improving performance. Paradoxically, each 
change also brought with it unanticipated outcomes, 
meaning that further changes were required in order to 
achieve  desired  performance  levels.     Indeed  such 
adaptation was needed as not all difficulties could be 
anticipated in advance. 
In fact, incorporating flexibility in organisational 
arrangements helps to ensure that public values of 
effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, transparency, 
competitiveness, professionalism and risk readiness [6], all 
important considerations for NGI [1], are protected. This 
study makes an original contribution to knowledge by 
providing    a    longitudinal    study    of    the    changing 
inter-organisational arrangements put in place to maintain 
public buildings. By demonstrating ongoing adaptation of 
organisational arrangements, a better understanding of the 
organisational aspect of NGI [7] is achieved. 
This      study      concludes      that      adaptation      of 
inter-organisational arrangements, such as the procurement 
of asset maintenance, is essential in order to address 
emergent issues and unanticipated outcomes. Indeed, as 
organisations would have great difficulty in predicting all 
of  the  potential  outcomes  of  a  particular  set  of  new 
inter-organisational arrangements in advance, ongoing 
adaptation is a logical strategy to deal with such 
uncertainty. 
 
II.  STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Asset maintenance arrangements in the state of Omicron 
(a pseudonym) underwent significant change over a 20 year 
period. This in itself is not surprising, as if organisational 
arrangements for asset management do not meet 
government expectations, logically they will be changed. 
However, the specific details of the asset management 
arrangements, and the theoretical and practical reasons for 
the changes to these arrangements, need to be examined. 
Consequently, the research question addressed in this paper 
is: How and why did asset management arrangements 
in Omicron change over time? 
 
III.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Contracting-out of government services fundamentally 
changed the nature of service delivery for many OECD 
government agencies [8]. Proponents of the wide scale 
contracting-out of government services argue that 
considerable cost savings to government can be achieved 
through the private delivery of public services, due to the 
market efficiencies of a competitive tendering system [9]. 
“Contracting-out occurs when a government or public 
agency ceases to provide a specific activity or service 
through directly employing its own staff and instead 
purchases that service or activity from a private 
corporation or non-government agency” [10]. 
In Omicron the impact of these changes was that the 
everyday maintenance of buildings ceased to be provided 
by the state and was instead contracting-out to private 
providers with the goal of improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of maintenance [11]. 
Contracting-out has been argued to provide the benefits 
of efficiency (lower costs), effectiveness (chiefly through 
improved service delivery and quality), and greater 
flexibility in the provision of services [12]. The efficiency 
is achieved primarily through the competitive process 
generated by companies bidding to provide services to 
government under contract. This competition tends to 
motivate firms to reduce costs, and develop innovative 
products and/or services. While [13] argues that the 
contracting-out of asset maintenance services to the private 
sector by government, has generally delivered cost savings, 
they also note that the results vary depending on how the 
contracting-out process is managed. This paper focuses on 
the changing inter-organisational arrangements involved in 
maintaining built assets in Omicron State. (While labour 
issues can also be elements of the decision to contract out, 
these are not the focus of this paper). 
While the performance of contracting-out arrangements 
has been studied in various situations before, longitudinal 
analysis of the changing inter-organisational arrangements 
are under-researched, as are the reasons for such changes. 
 
IV.  METHODOLOGY 
Undertaking an in-depth analysis of a particular issue as 
it impacts an organisation can be undertaken as a case 
study, as such a strategy can provide strong 
recommendations for improvements in theory, technology 
or policy [14, 15].  Reference [16] argues that cases are 
particularly appropriate for examining situations in which 
rules are in a state of flux and are changing rapidly, such as 
appears to be the case with asset management in Omicron. 
As little work has been undertaken the area of analysing 
routine contractual arrangements over time [17, 18], using 
qualitative case study methodology is appropriate [19], as 
case studies can develop the application of theory to an area 
[20]. Further, [21] argues that case study research often 
includes multiple data collection methods such as 
interviews and documents, both of which are used in this 
study. Individuals and organisations have not been 
identified in this paper. Government reports which may 
reveal the identity of the state being discussed here have 
also been de-identified and replaced with a code. 
 
V.  FINDINGS 
Over a 20 year period, four distinct sets of asset 
management arrangements can be determined in Omicron. 
Assets  maintained  during  this  time  included:  hospitals, 
schools, major and minor office buildings, police stations 
and remand facilities, in other words the built assets which 
deliver much of the social infrastructure of Omicron state. 
These specific sets of arrangements have been stylised as 
Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta in order to de-identify the 
agencies involved. A summary of the various arrangements 
can be found in Table 1 below. 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF ASSET MAINTENANCE ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Each set of arrangements is examined in detail below: 
 
 
A. Alpha Arrangements [Alpha] (1984 to 1996) 
 
In 1984, Alpha was established to coordinate a range of 
building services on behalf of the Omicron State 
government, including design, construction, and asset 
management and maintenance services. Under this 
arrangement Alpha undertook asset management and 
maintenance services on behalf of client agencies and 
maintained  the  majority  government  buildings  (Int.  11, 
2005). Much of the provision of these services was 
provided in house. However in 1991, Alpha also contracted 
out maintenance and construction services in order to 
handle periods of peak load with the private sector. These 
arrangements are summarised through Fig. 1 below: 
 
 
Fig. 1: Alpha arrangements (source: interviews and documents) 
 
While these arrangements were considered to be 
effective for a period of time, some private and public 
sector agents felt that the arrangements were less than 
optimal.  Two  formal  government  reviews  investigated 
these concerns, [11], and determined that contracting-out 
various activities of government including maintenance, 
would improve efficiency at a national level. More 
specifically, a whole chapter of one of these reports [11] 
evaluated the performance of Alpha, and raised a number of 
issues of concern to the government of the day: 
oThe operations of Alpha were regarded as inefficient; 
o Its labour force was perceived as being 50% more 
expensive than private contractors; and, 
oPart of the work force did not have sufficient work to 
keep them gainfully occupied. 
[11] concluded that $20 million per annum could be 
saved if the construction and maintenance activities of 
Alpha were contracted-out to the private sector. While by 
1993, $1.3 billion of Omicron State government services 
had already been contracted out, much of this occurred in 
an unstructured manner in the absence of a whole of 
government   policy   [11].   Following   this   government 
review, all design, construction and maintenance activities 
carried out by Alpha were tendered out to the private sector 
with government retaining only an inspection and 
maintenance scheduling role [11] after 1996. Alpha 
downsized its staff from 1,400 staff to 400 staff; and 
disbanding it’s construction, design and maintenance 
sections of Alpha (Int. 11, 2005). 
 
B.   Beta Arrangements [Beta] (1996 to 2001) 
Hundreds of small building maintenance contracts were 
consolidated   into   a   series   of   facilities   management 
contracts [FMs], from 1996 onwards. These FMs managed 
the building contractors and day-to-day FM activities [11]. 
This model of contracting-out went beyond the normal 
contracting-out of government services, as the facilities 
management arrangements involved the use of third parties 
who would undertake purchasing on behalf of government 
agencies [11].   Beta was established to manage these 
centralized FM contracts [11]. This entity took over the 
previous responsibilities of Alpha in the management of 
building maintenance contracts, and accounted for 2% of 
total government expenditure in 1998/1999 [11]. 
A different structure was implemented for Beta 
compared to Alpha for the delivery of asset management 













Fig. 2: Beta arrangements (source: documents and interviews) 
 
As Fig. 2 suggests, Beta was in charge of managing the 
contracts with the Facility Managers [hereafter FM] and 
also undertook performance management activities. A total 
of five FMs were appointed to manage and provide 
maintenance services for the Omicron government under 
Beta, with each of the FMs responsible for managing 
maintenance in a specific geographic area. 
The  FMs either used their own staff or sub-contracted 
another service provider to complete required work on a 
client agency’s’ property [11]. While there were only five 
FMs in the metropolitan region, they in turn sub-contracted 
around 1,000 smaller businesses to complete work on their 
behalf [11]. While seen as an improvement over Alpha, 
specific difficulties in implementation – particularly with 
different FM companies being responsible for specific 
geographic areas, made the process of obtaining 
maintenance services difficult for departments such as 
education, which operated across large geographical areas. 
 
C.  Gamma Arrangements [Gamma] (2001-2006) 
A review of the machinery of government in Omicron 
State  in  2001  resulted  in  a  new  framework  for  the 
contracting-out of maintenance services (Int. 10, 2005). In 
May 2002, Beta ceased and in July 2002, Gamma 
commenced [11]. While similar to Beta in some ways, there 
were specific differences in Gamma which will be noted 
below. 
Gamma continued the philosophy of Beta in the 
contracting-out of maintenance services. However the basis 
of agreement was a partnership arrangement which did not 
rely upon a contract to regulate the relationship, apart from 
ensuring key milestones and deliverables (Int. 10, 2005). 
While established as a ‘client choice’ model, Gamma (Int. 
10, 2005) was structured around a service provider panel 
approach, where prequalification of suppliers ensured that 
the choice by government departments is limited to service 
providers who meet certain government criteria (Int. 13, 
2005). 
Under Beta, FMs were appointed to look after a specific 
geographic area in the main metropolitan area. This 
arrangement meant that larger departments (e.g. Education 
and Police) could work with up to five different FMs across 
the city, as well as their call centres (Int. 10, 2005), as work 
was allocated by geographic responsibility.  This approach 
changed under Gamma framework, in which FMs were 
allocated to a specific agency, although FMs were able to 
win more than one contract. This meant that each 
government agency selected just one FM to work with in 
the metropolitan area: 
Prior to [Gamma] they had five FMs looking after 
premises … [now] there is just one contract for the 
whole metropolitan area and one facilities manager, 
so it just works so much better (Int. 3, 2003). 
This new situation was perceived as an improvement by 
government agencies [11]. These arrangements can be seen 
in Fig. 3 below: 
 
Fig. 3: Gamma arrangements (source: documents & interviews) 
 
While an improvement, not all aspects went according to 
plan. Some of these are detailed below: 
1)  Centralised call centre 
Another change from the Beta arrangements in Gamma 
was that all calls for breakdown repairs were done through 
a single call centre (Int. 10, 2005). The main criticism with 
the Beta arrangement was that FM call centres allocated 
work to themselves which was seen as “Dracula being in 
charge of the blood blank” [11]. The establishment of a 
centralised call centre meant that there should be a fair 
allocation of work to all FMs. 
However, the new call centre was located in a regional 
centre of Omicron State, and was managed by a non-profit 
group which did not have previous experience in building 
maintenance. The town in which this call centre was 
located had lost employment due to economic downturn 
and government restrictions on the primary industry. As a 
result the Omicron government decided to locate the call 
centre to this town, in order to promote employment in the 
area (Int. 10, 2005).  While the call centre addressed the 
issue of self allocation of work by FMs, it also created 
another. As the operators where not from the industry, nor 
was the organisation which won the contract, there was a 
distinct lack of industry specific knowledge in the call 
centre which in turn had a significant detrimental impact on 
operations. 
Every job logged through a call centre was given a 
priority. Given the available resources, prioritisation was 
necessary, as it was impossible to respond to every single 
call out as a top priority (Int. 5, 2003). FM staff that had 
previously operated in call centres knew this, and worked 
with the clients to help prioritise the maintenance requests. 
Unfortunately, this industry specific knowledge, which 
enabled the prioritisation of different types of maintenance 
jobs to be negotiated, was not intrinsic to the organisation 
that won the call centre contract (Int. 10, 2005). In fact, the 
central call centre classified 38% of calls as Priority 1, 
while only 7% of repairs to government houses were 
classified as urgent in the same period [11]. This surge in 
Priority 1 jobs led to an increase in the costs associated with 
maintenance, as Priority 1 jobs had to be responded to 
within 24 hours by contractors. The urgent response also 
was paid at higher hourly rates compared to other types of 
repairs.  Additionally, staff at the call centre, had little 
knowledge of the metropolitan area, and often allocated 
contractors to jobs at some distance from their base, 
resulting in a large spike in travelling costs [11]. Increased 
Priority 1 requests meant that maintenance activities were 
conducted in a reactive manner, and efficiencies associated 
with planning for works, were lost; likewise the ability to 
minimise travel costs was reduced [11]. 
While some problems associated with the regional 
allocation of FMs to clients were addressed and improved 
under Gamma, additional problems were created. In other 
words, while adaptation occurred and some improvements 
enjoyed, there were also some unanticipated outcomes and 
further improvement was still possible. The largest issue 
was  the  high  number  of  Priority  1  jobs  being  logged, 
followed by the spike in travel costs, due to the lack of 
clients who create an effective monopoly in a restricted 
‘market’, as a result of working with few alternative 
suppliers, [8]. This result underscores the need to maintain 
competition under contracting-out arrangements in order to 
keep prices down. 
1)  Centralised call centre 
As noted earlier, the centralised call centre established 
under Gamma addressed the issue of FMs allocating 
themselves work, but the lack of industry-specific 
knowledge and understanding of the geographic area of the 
metropolitan area amongst call centre staff, resulted in a 
spike in costs [11]. Consequently, the call centre became 
located back within government under Delta [11]. 
















Fig. 4: Delta arrangements (source: documents & interviews) 
 
2)  Changes to fees and rates 
Under Gamma, sub-contractors were allowed to charge 
an hourly rate plus travel (Int. 3, 2003). This factor was one 
reason for increased costs of services [11] and in the revised 
Delta framework the hourly rate included travelling costs 
(Int. 3, 2003). Additionally, a schedule of rates was used in 
order to reduce variance in the prices charged by 
contractors [11]. The schedule includes 5,000 items that 
can be paid against an agreed price schedule. This process 
ensures  that  contractors  do  not  overcharge  for  specific 
items of hardware. 
 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
There has been a series of iterations of contracting out of 
maintenance services in Omicron State. These have 
involved a change from: geographic allocation to client 
choice of FMs; multiple call centres to central call centre; 
rd 
industry knowledge amongst call centre staff. industry  based  call  centre  to  3 party  call  centre  to 
 
D.  Delta Arrangements [Delta] – (2005 – 2008) 
Despite some of the improvements attempted under 
Gamma, not all innovations in asset maintenance services 
went according to plan. Under Gamma the previous 
arrangement  of  geographical  allocation  of  FMs  ceased, 
with a client choice model replacing it. This change meant 
that each agency worked with one FM across the CBD and 
metropolitan areas. This certainly made it easier for larger 
clients,   like   education   and   police,   who   had   widely 
dispersed built assets. Unfortunately some contractors 
increased their charges as they only were working for a 
single  client  [11].  Governments  can  become  captive  to 
government  call  centre;  central  procurement  to  policy 
driven CTC to client choice contracting; as government 
sought to achieve best value for its money. 
As indicated in the introduction cost savings were an 
intended outcome of the contracting out of asset 
management services. Clients were charged the actual cost 
of materials and labour, a management fee from the FMs, 
and an administrative fee by Beta / Gamma / Delta. 
Omicron reviews indicate that cost savings were 
consistently achieved across all of the various 
arrangements, although these were less than anticipated in 
some cases. These savings were partly as a result of a 
reduction  in  the  overall  cost  of  materials  and  labour. 
However there were also significant savings due to 
reduction in management fees.  Some clients, felt that they 
were better off under Gamma (Int. 2, 2003), while some 
former employees felt that the Gamma fees were too low 
and would have a negative impact on quality (Int. 1, 2003). 
In 1998, 82% of the agencies using the three major FMs 
were satisfied by the costs of the service provided to them 
[11]. 
Thus a key aspect of the implementation of contracting 
out of asset management services resulted in significant 
savings to government. And yet, each implementation 
experienced unanticipated difficulties which needed further 
adaptation in organisational arrangements in order to 
address. 
As noted in the introduction, the notion of 
inter-organisational routines provides an interesting way of 
analysing multi-actor achievement of specific outcomes for 
organisations. As has been shown in the various figures 
above, the changes from Alpha to Beta to Gamma to Delta 
all involved changes to the process of the delivery of 
maintenance services to government assets. As detailed in 
the text, these changes were needed as previous 
arrangements did not deliver all of the anticipated outcomes 
anticipated by Omicron government, or because it was 
perceived that additional improvement in performance 
could be achieved. 
According to [22] a routine can be altered by a range of 
learning processes.   Routines change in response to 
experience – if a routine succeeds in achieving a target it is 
likely to be used again, and less likely to be used if it fails 
[22, 275]. Unfortunately, a positive experience with an 
inferior routine can encourage organisations to continue 
using a specific routine, instead of experimenting with 
novel routines which may achieve superior performance 
[17, 23]. In other words experience on its own is 
insufficient for learning. Assessment that current 
performance is inadequate or that there is still room for 
improvement needs to be derived from experiences. While 
poor performance is often cited as the reason for adaptation 
in routines, Feldman [24] argues that incremental change 
actually occurs for several reasons. These include: 
o The actions do not produce the anticipated outcomes 
o Actions produce new problems that need to be 
solved 
o Actions can result in new opportunities or resources 
o Actions produce the intended outcome, but further 
improvements are still possible [24, p.620] 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that each of the 
maintenance arrangements in Omicron where a conscious 
attempt to improve on the previous set of arrangements. 
However, some changes (such as the call centre located 
in a regional country town, and the way FMs were 
allocated) resulted in unanticipated problems which needed 
to be solved under a subsequent routine. 
The findings reflect the reasons for incremental change 
argued by [24]: adaptation can result in unanticipated 
outcomes which became problems which needed to be 
resolved, or when an intended outcome was achieved, 
further improvements were still possible. In other words, 
adaptation does not always lead to improved performance 
[25]. 
It is possible to view each of the inter-organisational 
routines reviewed above as not being successful – given 
that there were issues involved with the implementation of 
each of these sets of arrangements. However, this would be 
unfair as the probability that every problem could be 
foreseen in advance, is highly unlikely [26]. Consequently, 
the capability of an organisation to vary its routine 
arrangements is an essential way of dealing with 
uncertainty  involved  with  the  implementation  of  new 
inter-organisational arrangements. 
However, the changes implemented in the building 
maintenance routines noted above, were often not 
incremental, but involved significant changes to the 
organisational arrangements, which were locked into 
contractual obligations for an average of five year blocks of 
time. 
While radical change can provide large dividends if 
successful, the story of contracting out of maintenance 
services, seems to underscore the importance of gradual 
incremental change in inter-organisational arrangements, in 
preference to large scale change, particularly when the 
optimal set of arrangements is difficult to pre-determine. As 
argued elsewhere: 
 
“adaptiveness will sometimes solve problems and 
sometimes create them; and slow, imprecise 
adaptation is often better than fast, precise 
adaptation, particularly in the long run” [27, 115]. 
 
VII.  LIMITATIONS 
Historical recall of an event in interviews is reliant on 
correct recollection for the reasons behind an event. While 
such memories might be correct, they could also provide 
data which are closer to post hoc rationalisations instead 
[28]. The design of the study, which used secondary 
documents when available, meant that the answers could be 
triangulated and supported from more than one source, thus 
improving the validity and reliability of the data and 
findings of the study. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS 
This study has undertaken a review of asset management 
activities in Omicron State over a 20 year period. There 
were four distinctly different sets of organisational 
arrangements put in place during this time. While there 
were significant cost savings, these were sometimes less 
than anticipated, and there were also unanticipated 
difficulties involved with each of these implementations. 
Consequently, reviews of process, often formal reviews, 
resulted in significant organisational changes to the asset 
management regimes over time. Asset management 
contracted by third parties may fail to deliver optimal 
management of those assets, particularly when specific 
asset management knowledge and expertise is lacking. 
Firstly, such findings support the assertion that routines, 
while providing for stability in inter-organisational 
arrangements, also can be changed when these are not seen 
to be performing [24]. However, the potential for some 
adaptations of inter-organisational arrangements to deliver 
less than optimal outcomes suggests that gradual change 
may be preferable to radical change. As noted above, while 
cost savings where achieved, these were sometimes less 
than what was anticipated, and new inter-organisational 
routines sometimes resulted in new problems which then 
needed to be solved. 
Second, the case study does not provide much support 
for    rapid    and    large    scale    adaptation    of    routine 
inter-organisational maintenance arrangements. Instead, 
incremental gradual change would appear to be a better 
strategy for coping with the unanticipated outcomes that 
often   accompany   the   implementation   of   changes   to 
inter-organisational routines. 
In summary, the paper has shown that routine 
organisational arrangements can and do change over time. 
Adaptation of routine processes is essential in order to 
adjust various inter-organisational arrangements in order to 
respond to unanticipated outcomes that arise. Adaptation 
does not always deliver improvements, nor can all 
difficulties be anticipated in advance. Consequently, the 
ability      to      continue      to      evaluate      and      adapt 
inter-organisational arrangements appears to be a critical 
strategic action for government agencies. Adaptation of the 
inter-organisational arrangements which manage critical 
infrastructures  is  important  to  developing  our 
understanding of NGI as complex socio-technical systems 
[1, 7]. 
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